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O

ne of the many painful lessons learned from the
mortgage crisis that began
in 2007 is that foreclosure is often a
costly, slow, ineficient, and uncertain process. The additional cost and
uncertainty for lenders are magniied
when the balance of the mortgage
debt exceeds the value of the collateral (that is, when the borrower is
“underwater”), and thus full recovery by the lender of its investment is
unlikely. Ways to avoid this misery
are for the lender (usually represented by the servicer for a secondary
market purchaser or a securitized
trust) and the borrower to enter into
a deed in lieu of foreclosure or for the
lender to approve a short sale.

What is needed—
but what standard
mortgage law does
not provide—is a
way for a borrower
to deliver a deed in
lieu or short sale
deed that will wipe
out junior liens,
at least in cases
in which they
have no value.

Beneits of Deeds in Lieu
and Short Sales

iStockphoto

A deed in lieu of foreclosure has
many advantages for both parties. Unlike an actual foreclosure, it
attracts no unwanted negative public attention, a fact that both lenders
and borrowers may appreciate. From
the lender’s viewpoint, it provides a
much quicker way of obtaining title
to the real estate than foreclosure,
with less uncertainty, lower legal
expenses, and a reduced risk of the
borrower’s vandalizing or neglecting
the property.
A deed in lieu also has beneits to
borrowers. Its effect on the borrower’s credit score is less detrimental
than an actual foreclosure. If properly structured, it can ensure that the
mortgage debt is fully discharged,
thus avoiding the risk of a deiciency
judgment against the borrower that
accompanies a foreclosure in most
states. Sometimes the process of
negotiating a deed in lieu will even
result in a modest payment from the
lender to the borrower to help defray
the costs of vacating the property.
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Likewise, a short sale carries the
same beneits and advantages. In
a short sale, the borrower conveys
title to the mortgaged real estate to a
third-party purchaser for a price that
relects fair market value but is less
than (or “short” of) the outstanding
mortgage balance. In order for the
borrower to convey marketable title
to the purchaser, the lender releases
its mortgage lien in exchange for
receipt of all of the net sale proceeds.
The Barrier of Junior Liens
In light of these mutual advantages,
one might have expected a large proportion of the residential defaults that
occurred during the mortgage crisis to have been resolved by deeds in
lieu or short sales. To some degree,
this did not occur because of structural reasons; servicers often were not
suficiently knowledgeable and wellstaffed to work out these voluntary
arrangements with their borrowers
in a timely manner. But there is also a
frequent legal barrier to deeds in lieu
and short sales: the presence of junior
liens. If the property is also subject to
a junior lien, as a practical matter the
senior mortgagee can agree to a deed
in lieu or short sale only if the junior
lienholder consents.
The reason is simple. A deed in
lieu or a short sale is not a foreclosure. The proper foreclosure of a irst
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priority lien will eliminate all junior
liens, thus permitting the foreclosure purchaser to take clear title to
the property. A deed in lieu or short
sale has no such effect. Any junior
lien will continue to encumber the
property after the deed is delivered.
Although the grantee of the deed
can then foreclose against the junior
lienor to clear the title of the lien, the
cost and delay of doing so defeats the
whole purpose of using a deed in lieu
or short sale in the irst place.
Particularly during a housing market decline, such as that of 2007–2010,
the balance owing on some defaulted
irst mortgages will exceed the property’s value. In this situation, a junior
lien has no value; if an actual foreclosure sale were held, the proceeds
would not be suficient to pay off the
irst mortgage in full, much less to
pay anything on the junior lien. But
even if the junior lien is valueless, it
clouds the property’s title, frustrating the use of a deed in lieu or a short
sale and effectively forcing an otherwise avoidable foreclosure. This is
problematic because these foreclosures not only involve the costs to
borrowers and lenders noted previously but also reduce the value of
neighboring parcels and thus impose
a cost on neighboring owners and
communities.
What is needed—but what
standard mortgage law does not provide—is a way for a borrower to
deliver a deed in lieu or short sale
deed that will wipe out junior liens,
at least in cases in which they have
no value. This article discusses a new
model act intended to accomplish this
result.
The Model Negotiated
Alternative to Foreclosure Act
In 2015, the Uniform Law Commission (ULC) promulgated the Uniform
Home Foreclosure Procedures Act
(UHFPA), a large and complex act
dealing with many aspects of mortgage foreclosure. The UHFPA was
intended to overlay existing state
foreclosure legislation, but thus far
it has not achieved any enactments.
This is not surprising, given its broad
scope and the desires of consumer
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and lending advocates to maintain
any respective advantages they have
under present foreclosure law. Broadscale reform of mortgage foreclosure
law is not for the faint of heart!
In July 2017, the ULC concluded that
one particular article of the UHFPA—
the “Negotiated Transfer” provisions
in UHFPA Article 5—had suficient
merit and potential for adoption, so the
ULC carved these provisions off into
a freestanding act labeled the Model
Negotiated Alternative to Foreclosure
Act (MNAFA). This act is a targeted
response to the problem of junior liens
hindering the use of deeds in lieu and
short sales. It authorizes the borrower
and lender to negotiate a transfer of the
property to the lender and provides
that “all . . . interests subordinate to the
interest of the creditor that is a party to
the proposed negotiated transfer are
extinguished.” MNAFA § 5(a).
This result is well and good if
the junior liens are valueless but, if
not, wiping them out in this fashion would be unwarranted and
unfair. Hence, one of the act’s principal objectives is to ensure that only
fully underwater junior liens are terminated by the borrower’s transfer
of title to the lender. The act accomplishes this in a rather ingenious
fashion, effectively allowing the
junior lienholders to decide for themselves whether their liens are worth
preserving. The procedure outlined
by the act is as follows.
If the parties to the irst mortgage propose a negotiated transfer,
they must irst send notice to all
subordinate lienholders. If a judicial foreclosure is already pending,
the court sends the notice; otherwise
it is sent by the foreclosing creditor. MNAFA § 4(a) & (b). Each junior
lienor then has 20 days from the date
the notice was sent to object in writing to the proposed transfer. MNAFA
§ 3(a)(4). If no objections are received
within the 20-day period, the parties
can complete the transfer, wiping out
all junior interests. MNAFA § 6(a).
If a junior lienholder objects, however, it can redeem the property from
the irst mortgage lien by tendering
the amount of the irst mortgage obligation and, in effect, buying the irst

Restricting junior
lienholders to the
option of redemption
is necessary to
achieve the act’s
primary purpose:
a fair, quick,
and inexpensive
resolution of the
foreclosure.
lien. Obviously, the junior lienor will
do so only if it believes the property
is worth more than the irst lien obligation. If a junior lienor makes such
a tender, the creditor holding the irst
lien is paid in full.
If a judicial foreclosure is pending,
the court must set a date, not more
than 30 days after receipt of the objection, for the objecting lienor to pay
off the irst mortgage. MNAFA § 5(a).
If no judicial proceeding is pending,
the creditor must initiate a judicial proceeding so the court can set
a redemption date for the objecting
lienor. MNAFA § 5(c). In either case, if
the junior lienor fails to tender by the
date set, its lien is extinguished.
To an extent, the MNAFA provides the irst mortgagee with a
remedy that is analogous to an
Article 9 secured party’s right to propose “strict foreclosure” (that is, the
secured party’s retention of the collateral in satisfaction of the secured
obligation). UCC §§ 9-620 to 9-622.
The remedies are not precisely the
same, however. Under an Article 9
strict foreclosure, if a junior secured
party objects to a strict foreclosure
proposal, the senior effectively must
proceed with a foreclosure sale. But
an Article 9 foreclosure sale can be
a private sale that can happen in as
little as a few weeks and that has no
spillover effects on other debtors.
By contrast, a real estate foreclosure
must occur in a public auction that

may take months or years to complete and is likely to reduce the value
of neighboring parcels. By requiring
the objecting junior lienor to redeem
its lien position (rather than allowing the junior to force a foreclosure
sale), the MNAFA quite appropriately prevents the truly underwater
junior lienholder from imposing these
unwarranted foreclosure costs on
the lender, the borrower, and third
parties.
Restricting junior lienholders to
the option of redemption is necessary
to achieve the act’s primary purpose:
a fair, quick, and inexpensive resolution of the foreclosure. It might
be argued, however, that it is unfair
to junior lienholders who have little or no access to capital, because it
requires an objecting junior to come
up with the funds to redeem the
senior mortgages. This is unlikely to
be an issue for institutional or professional lenders, but it might be
problematic for some individuals.
On balance, the act’s approach seems
justiiable.
By its terms, the act applies only to
transfers by a homeowner to a creditor. This is well and good for deeds
in lieu of foreclosure, but how will
it work in a short sale situation? The
answer is that the chain of title for
the short sale must pass through the
creditor. Thus, two deeds will be necessary: one from the homeowner to
the creditor and a second from the
creditor to the short sale purchaser.
Doubtless the creditor will insist that
the deed it delivers be without warranty of title, but the act raises no
objection to that.
Multiple Objecting Junior
Creditors
Because all junior creditors will
receive notice of the proposed transfer, it is possible that more than one
of them will ile an objection. In this
situation, the court must establish an
orderly process for recognizing their
rights of redemption. To accomplish
this, the court ixes a series of dates
and assigns a date to each junior
lienor, in the reverse order of their
priority (that is, the most junior lienor
gets the earliest date). MNAFA § 5(b).
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Each objecting junior lienor must tender an amount equal to the total of
the balances owing on all liens superior to its own. If any subordinate
lienor fails to tender by the applicable
date, its lien is extinguished and the
next (more senior) lienor is entitled to
its turn. MNAFA § 5(e).
This process is conceptually similar to the rights of junior lienholders
in an ordinary foreclosure; all juniors
are subject to being terminated by the
foreclosure of a senior lien, but each
has a common-law right to redeem its
lien from senior liens, provided that
they redeem before the foreclosure
sale. The difference under MNAFA is
that, once the notices of the proposed
transfer are sent, redemption is the
only course of action that will prevent
an objecting junior’s lien from being
extinguished.
Some Reinements
Several other features of MNAFA are
also worth mention. As with UHFPA,
the act is limited to mortgages on
one-to-four-family residential properties. MNAFA § 2(6). This restriction
stems from the fact that it was residential foreclosures that severely clogged
the courts and bogged down servicers during the mortgage crisis, and
perhaps from the fact that UHFPA’s
drafters hoped it would be easier to
get enactments if the support of commercial mortgage lenders were not
required. Conceptually, however, the
principles of MNAFA could be applied
equally well to nonresidential mortgage loans.
There is also a limit on the ability
of borrowers and lenders to negotiate the transfer: the lender must
accept the property in full satisfaction of the debt. MNAFA § 3(a). Even
if the property is underwater with
respect to the irst mortgage, the
lender cannot preserve the right to
a deiciency judgment. This provision may help some consumers avoid
poorly negotiated transfer deals. It
surely corresponds with the result
most borrowers would expect and is
consistent with Article 9’s analogous
prohibition on partial strict foreclosure in consumer transactions. UCC
§ 9-620(g). But nothing in the act

Although the
act’s process will
be of greatest
use to first
mortgage lenders,
it is equally
available to a
junior mortgagee.

prevents the lender from agreeing to
pay the borrower some additional
money (“cash for keys”) to help
defray moving expenses and encourage the borrower’s agreement.
The act’s procedures and restrictions apply only if the parties opt to
be subject to it, and so state in their
agreement. MNAFA § 3(a)(2). If the
lender’s title examination discloses
no junior liens, the parties may prefer to use a traditional deed in lieu (in
which case the act does not apply).
MNAFA § 6(f). If there are multiple
owners of the real estate, the choice
to proceed under the act is available
only if all the owners agree. MNAFA
§ 3(a)(1). Obligors who are liable
on the debt, however, but have no
interest in the real estate (for example, guarantors), need not consent
because they have no downside risk.
Although the act’s process will
be of greatest use to irst mortgage
lenders, it is equally available to a
junior mortgagee. The act has no
effect, however, on mortgages or
liens senior to the mortgage that is
the subject of the negotiated transfer. MNAFA § 6(a), § 5 cmt. 3. For
example, assume a home is subject
to an unpaid property tax lien and a
homeowner’s association lien, both
of which are superior in priority to a
irst mortgage. If the borrower and
the mortgagee engage in a negotiated
transfer under the act, the mortgagee
will take title subject to the HOA and
tax liens (the same result as in a conventional foreclosure).
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Conclusion
As noted above, underwater junior
liens impede negotiated settlements
of defaulted mortgage loans and thus
impose unwarranted foreclosurerelated costs on borrowers, lenders,
neighboring landowners, and local
communities. The authors conclude
that the Model Negotiated Alternative to Foreclosure Act provides a
careful, balanced, and thoughtful
solution to this problem. It is neither pro-borrower nor pro-lender, but
is designed to facilitate cooperation
between the parties to a mortgage
loan when they ind it in their mutual
interest. It would not replace any
aspect of the traditional foreclosure
process but instead provides an alternative that can be advantageous to
both parties. It would protect consumers who use it against the risk of
a future deiciency judgment, as we
think it should, and would prevent
truly underwater junior lienholders
from compromising eficient settlements by demanding “ransom” for
the release of worthless junior liens.
In sum, it is an excellent addition to
the panoply of mortgage remedies
and deserves favorable consideration
from state legislatures throughout the
nation. n
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